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IS "PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE" A SOLUTION
TO THE PROBLEM OF DEFENDING BATTERED
WOMEN WHO KILL?
A growing number of battered women face prosecution after killing
their abusive spouses.' Often the women respond to the homicide charges
by pleading self-defense. 2 Despite evidence of years of physical and psychological abuse, the women's claims of self-defense often are unsuccessful
because the women are unable to satisfy the traditional elements of selfdefense.3 In an effort to satisfy the requirements of the traditional doctrine
of self-defense, battered women sometimes offer expert testimony concerning
the battered woman syndrome. 4 The battered woman syndrome is a cyclical
pattern of physical and psychological abuse that distinguishes an abusive
relationship.5 Frequently, however, expert testimony concerning the battered
woman syndrome fails to help establish battered women's claims of selfdefense. 6 In response to the problems facing battered women defendants,
one commentator has proposed an alternative to the traditional doctrine of

1. See Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619, 619 (1986) (discussing battered women who kill their spouses).
Approximately 1/3 to 1/2 of all women experience spouse abuse. See Schneider, Equal Rights
to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623,
624 (1980) (discussing frequency of spouse abuse). In approximately 33% of homicides involving
female victims, the victim's husband committed the homicide. See Rodwan, The Defense of
Those Who Defend Themselves, 65 MICH. B.J. 64, 64 (1986). Married or cohabitating mates
commit 25% of all murders. Id. For the purposes of this Note, "spouse" refers to a battered
woman's spouse or live-in partner.
2. See C. EwING, BATTERED WoVmEN WHNO KILL 6 (1987) (discussing defense of battered
women who kill their spouses).
3. Id. Many battered women defendants have difficulty establishing claims of selfdefense because of the traditional structure and interpretation of the self-defense doctrine. See
Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 427, 427 (1987)
(discussing problems with self-defense doctrine in battered woman context). The women's
claims of self-defense often are unsuccessful because the women fail to prove that, at the time
of the killing, the women reasonably believed that they were in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm. See C. EwINo, supra note 2, at 47 (discussing barriers to battered women
defendants' successful claims of self-defense). Additionally, battered women defendants often
fail to show that deadly force was necessary to prevent the harm. Id.; see also infra notes 929 and accompanying text (discussing battered women defendants' ability to satisfy the elements
of traditional self-defense doctrine).
4. See Note, supra note 1, at 619 (discussing use of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome to support claim of self-defense); infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text (discussing
battered woman syndrome).
5. See Note, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FA.. L. 373, 373 n.1 (1986-87) (defining
battered woman syndrome); infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (discussing battered
woman syndrome).
6. See Comment, supra note 3, at 428 (discussing instances of battered women failing
to prove self-defense despite testimony concerning battered woman syndrome).
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self-defense called "psychological self-defense." ' 7 Under the doctrine of
psychological self-defense, a person may use deadly force to prevent serious8
psychological injury resulting from repeated physical and emotional abuse.
A.

TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENSE

Many battered women who kill their spouses after years of abuse seek
to justify the act as self-defense. 9 For a successful claim of self-defense, a
battered woman generally must satisfy each of the doctrine's elements.' 0
First, the battered woman must show that she reasonably believed that she
was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death at the time of the
killing." Second, the woman must show that she used only a reasonable
amount of force to prevent the danger. 2 Third, the woman must establish
that she did not instigate the violence. 13 Finally, in some jurisdictions, the
4
woman must prove that she had no safe avenue of retreat from the danger.'
The element requiring battered women to show that they reasonably

feared imminent danger or serious bodily harm [imminence requirement]
poses the most difficulty for battered women defendants." Under the
traditional doctrine of self-defense, a defendant reasonably must have
believed that the aggressor posed an immediate danger.' 6 Although some

7. See C. EwvNo, supra note 2, at 6 (proposing doctrine of psychological self-defense
to defend battered women who kill their spouses); infra notes 90-118 and accompanying text
(discussing theory of psychological self-defense).
8. See C. Ewino, supra note 2, at 6 (defining psychological self-defense).
9. See Frank, Driven to Kill: 'Battered Women' Strike Back, 70 A.B.A. J., December
1984, at 25, 26 (discussing battered women who kill their abusive spouses and claim that the
spouses' violence justified the killing).
10. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 623 (discussing elements of self-defense); W. LAFAvE
& A. ScoTT, CRIMNAL LAW § 5.7, at 454 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing doctrine of self-defense).
11. See Note, supra note 1, at 624 (discussing imminence requirement of self-defense
claim).
12. Id. at 623.
13. Id.
14. Id. A majority of jurisdictions hold that a person need not retreat from an aggressor
who reasonably appears to pose an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death. W.
LAFAvE & A. Scott, supra note 10, at § 5.7(0, at 460. A minority of jurisdictions, however,
hold that before using deadly force a person must retreat if the person can retreat in complete
safety. Id. at 461. In a jurisdiction requiring retreat, a person does not have to retreat from
his home unless the aggressor also lives in the home. Id.
15. See Comment, supra note 3, at 438 (discussing battered woman's difficulty in
satisfying claim of self-defense).
16. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 5.7(d), at 458. Under the current
interpretation of the imminence requirement, imminence does not mean inevitability. See
Comment, supra note 3, at 437. If the danger will not arise until some moment in the future,
the defendant may possess options for preventing the danger other than using deadly force.
W. LAFAvW & A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 5.7(d), at 458. Accordingly, threats alone do not
justify the use of deadly force. See Comment, supra note 3, at 437. The defendant must show
that the danger was immediate at the specific moment when the killing occurred to satisfy the
imminence requirement. Id.
Most jurisdictions require jurors to consider only the objective reasonableness of the
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women who kill their spouses in the midst of battering incidents can show

an imminent threat of serious injury or death, many battered women kill
their spouses during a lull in the violence, perhaps even when their spouses

are asleep. 7 Under a strict interpretation of the imminence requirement, if
the killing occurs during a lull in the violence, no threat of immediate
bodily injury or death exists." As a result, the battered women's claims of

self-defense often fail.' 9 Another major obstacle to a battered woman's
successful claim of self-defense is the element requiring the woman to use
2

only reasonable force to avert the danger [reasonable force requirement] . 0
Under the traditional self-defense doctrine, a person may use deadly force
defendant's belief that imminent danger existed. See Note, supra note 1, at 624. Therefore,
under the objective test, the defendant must in fact have believed that she was in imminent
danger and the belief must have been reasonable. Id. A minority of jurisdictions have applied
a subjective imminence requirement test. Id. Under the subjective test, the defendant must
show only that she honestly believed that danger was imminent and that defensive action was
necessary to avert the danger. Id. One commentator argues that courts should use the subjective
test because a person who reasonably believes that danger is imminent should not be required
to stop and evaluate the situation as another person might. See Rodwan, supra note 1, at 64.
According to the commentator, the inquiry should not be whether the defendant's claim was
rational, but whether the claim was true. Id.
17. See Frank, supra note 9, at 25 (discussing battered women who kill their spouses
during battering incidents); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 5.7(d), at 459 (discussing.
battered women who kill their spouses during a lull in violence). The severe physical injury
that battered women suffer during battering incidents would support the battered women's
claim that they reasonably believed that their spouses posed imminent threats of death or
serious bodily injury at the moments when the women killed their spouses. See Comment,
supra note 3, at 434 (discussing battered women's perceptions of spouses' violence). The fact
that the women's spouses had abused them in the past would strengthen the battered women's
claims that they reasonably feared serious injury. Id. In determining the reasonableness of a
defendant's belief, jurors could consider all the circumstances surrounding the killing, including
the defendant's knowledge of prior abuse by the defendant's spouse. Id. However, juries have
convicted many battered women who have killed their spouses during an acute battering
incident. See e.g., Patri v. Percy, 530 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (denying writ of habeas
corpus of convicted battered woman defendant); Hawthorne v. State, 377 So. 2d 780 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing conviction of battered woman defendant); Harrison v. State,
310 S.E.2d 506 (Ga. 1984) (affirming conviction of battered woman defendant for murder);
see also C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing convictions of battered women defendants
who kill their spouses during battering incidents).
18. See Comment, supra note 3, at 438 (discussing battered woman's failure to show
imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death). In many instances jurors perceive that a
battered woman premeditated before committing the homicidal act. See Frank, supra note 9,
at 25 (discussing battered women who kill unsuspecting spouses). One commentator has argued
that the imminent danger requirement is flawed because the requirement presupposes a single
violent act between the parties. See Schneider, supra note I, at 634 (discussing weaknesses of
traditional self-defense doctrine's imminence requirement). The requirement's emphasis on the
immediacy of the incident places battered women defendants at a disadvantage. Id. The
commentator argues that the traditional emphasis does not adequately consider past and future
abuse. Id.
19. See Comment, supra note 3, at 438 (discussing battered woman's failure to show
imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death).
20. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 633 (discussing reasonable force rule as applied to
battered women defendants).
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only if the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to avert death

or serious bodily injury. 2' The reasonable force requirement may preclude
the use of a deadly weapon against an unarmed aggressor.2 Battered women,
however, often defend themselves with weapons when their spouses are
unarmed. 23 Because juries often find that the battered women's use of
deadly weapons was unreasonable, the women's claims of self-defense often
24
fail.
In addition to the problems of establishing imminence and the use of
reasonable force, a battered woman defendant may face other obstacles in
asserting a claim of self-defense. 25 Some jurisdictions require the battered
woman to retreat, even from her home, if she can retreat safely. 26 Further-

more, some jurors may feel that the battered woman acted unreasonably
by choosing to remain with her spouse. 27 One commentator argues that the

traditional doctrine of self-defense contains a bias against women. 28 The
commentator also argues that sexual stereotyping inhibits jurors from ap-

preciating the reasonableness of the battered woman's belief that deadly

21. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 5.7(b), at 456 (discussing self-defense
doctrine's reasonable force element requiring use of only reasonable force to prevent violent
attack).
22. Id. Although the reasonable force rule generally prohibits the use of deadly force
against an unarmed aggressor, a jury may consider other factors in determining whether the
use of deadly force was reasonable. Id. at 457. The size and strength of the parties and the
aggressor's past threats and violent acts are factors that the jury may consider. Id.
23. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 633 (discussing battered women's use of deadly
force).
24. Id. One commentator argues that, as applied to battered women defendants, the
reasonable force requirement is flawed. Id. at 632. The commentator asserts that the rule
presumes that the parties are equal in size, strength, and physical training. Id. The commentator
also argues that battered women resort to using deadly weapons because past attempts to
protect themselves without weapons have failed. Id. In addition, the commentator contends
that the women often correctly believe that their spouses are capable of causing serious injury
or death without using a weapon. Id.
25. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing various difficulties in
establishing battered woman's claim of self-defense).
26. See Comment, supra note 3, at 433 (discussing self-defense doctrine's retreat requirement). If the aggressor lives with the woman, self-defense law may require a battered woman
to retreat from her own home. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 5.7(0, at 461; see
supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing retreat element of traditional doctrine of
self-defense).
27. See Rodwan, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing jury's perception of reasonableness of
battered woman's actions).
28. See Schneider,supra note 1, at 623. One commentator argues that society teaches
women that learning to defend themselves and engaging in violence is unfeminine. Id. at 628.
Thus, according to the commentator, women are unprepared to use defensive force. Id. The
commentator concludes that sex stereotypes have caused many courts to exclude evidence that
may be relevant to the women's defense. Id. at 636. The commentator charges that courts
have limited relevant evidence of past abuse and the spouses' reputation for violence by using
the reasonable force and imminence requirements. Id. The commentator argues that courts
deny women a fair trial and the equal protection of the laws if the courts do not allow juries
to consider all relevant factors. Id.

19881

PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE

force was necessary to avert imminent death or serious bodily injury. 29

B. THE BATTERED WomA_ SYNDRo0M
A battered woman who kills her spouse will frequently offer expert
testimony of the battered woman syndrome to support her claim of selfdefense. 0 A leading authority on battered women has defined the battered

woman syndrome as a cyclical pattern of physical and psychological abuse
that identifies an abusive relationship. 3 The abusive relationship between a
battered woman and her spouse has three distinct phases.3 2 A period of

building tension characterizes the first phase.3 3 The second phase consists
of an acute battering incident. 34 The third phase, a period of loving and

29. Id. at 629. According to one commentator, public misconceptions that a battered
woman enjoys the abuse or deserves the beatings inhibit jurors from finding that the woman's
actions were reasonable. Id. at 629. The commentator further argues that society traditionally
has viewed rationality and reasonableness as male characteristics. Id. at 636. Additionally, the
commentator asserts that society has viewed a woman as incapable of meeting the reasonable
man standard. Id.
30. See Comment, supra note 3, at 428 (discussing battered woman syndrome and selfdefense).
31. See L. VWALER, TnE BATTERED WOMAN 55 (1979) (defining battered woman syndrome).
32. Id. at 55-70 (describing stages of abusive relationship between battered woman and
spouse).
33. Id. at 56. During the first phase in the cyclical pattern of abuse between a battered
woman and her spouse, tension between the woman and her spouse increases as the spouse
verbally assaults and engages in minor acts of violence against the woman. Id. The woman
whose spouse has beaten her repeatedly in the past knows that the minor acts of violence will
escalate. Id. To prevent the abuse from increasing, the woman attempts to appease her spouse
and be as complacent as possible. Id. at 56. The battered woman often pretends the abuse
does not exist in her desperation to avert further abuse. Id. She denies being angry and
rationalizes that she may in fact deserve the abuse. Id. In addition, the woman may deny the
inevitability of the second phase, believing that she has control over the situation. Id. As the
minor battering incidents increase, the tension increases and the woman begins to lose control.
Id. At the same time, the spouse becomes possessive and jealous, fearing that the woman
might leave him. Id.
As the tension builds, any external event may trigger the second stage. Id. at 58. Aware
of the tension, the woman shuts herself off from friends and family, fearing that they may
upset her spouse. Id. As the woman's attempts to placate her spouse fail and the tension
becomes unbearable, the relationship moves into the second phase, the acute battering incident.
Id. at 59.
34. Id. During the second phase of the cycle of abuse, the woman's spouse acts in a
blind rage, often inflicting serious injury on the woman. Id. An uncontrollable release of the
phase one tensions occurs during the second phase. Id. Both the battered woman and her
spouse realize that the spouse's rage is out of control. Id. at 60. Because of the spouse's lack
of control, the woman cannot predict the extent of the violence that will occur during the
battering incident. Id. The lack of predictability and lack of control surrounding the situation
causes the woman to suffer severe psychological stress. Id. at 61. Before the incident, the
woman often becomes anxious and depressed and may suffer from psychosomatic illnesses like
fatigue, headaches, and stomachaches. Id.
The acute battering incident usually lasts from two to twenty-four hours during which

1532

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1527

contrite behavior by the woman's spouse, immediately follows the acute
36
battering incident.3" The third phase often is brief, and a new cycle begins.

Commentators assert that the cyclical nature of the abusive relationship
between a battered woman and her spouse creates "learned helplessness"
in the battered woman.17 According to the theory of learned helplessness,
a woman who experiences repeated beatings by her mate eventually will see

the abuse as unavoidable and will develop a feeling of helplessness." The
battered woman feels unable to control the beatings or any other aspect of
the relationship with her spouse.39 Psychologists argue that the battered

time the spouse repeatedly beats the woman. Id. at 60. Many battered women believe that
only their spouses can end the second stage of abuse. Id. at 61. Often the only option apparent
to the woman is to hide or wait out the violence. Id. at 61-62. The beatings may end when
the spouse becomes exhausted, but at other times, the reason he stops may be unclear. Id. at
61.
During the acute battering incident, the woman often feels she is unable to escape the
situation. Id. at 62. The woman may be afraid to resist for fear that she will provoke her
spouse into more severe violence. Id. After the incident is over, both the battered woman and
her spouse attempt to justify the abuse by making excuses for the incident. Id. at 62-63.
35. Id. at 65. During phase three of the abusive relationship, the battered woman's
spouse is very apologetic and promises to refrain from future abuse. Id. The spouse honestly
believes that he will be able to maintain control and never again will abuse the woman. Id.
The battered woman wants to believe that her spouse will change. Id. at 67. The spouse's
reasonableness and loving behavior during this phase convince the woman that her spouse will
no longer abuse her. Id. The spouse's behavior and the woman's adherence to the traditional
view of the permanency of love and marriage reinforces the woman's choice to remain with
her spouse. Id. The exact duration of the third phase is unclear, but appears to be longer
than phase two and shorter than phase one. Id. at 69.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 49, see also C. Ewno, supra note 2, at 66 (discussing learned helplessness
that battered women develop).
38. See Comment, supra note 3, at 432 (discussing theory of learned helplessness as
applied to battered women). Experimental psychologist, Martin Seligman, subjected laboratory
dogs to repeated electrical shocks. See Faigman, Discerning Justice When Battered Women
Kill (Book Review), 39 HAsmnGs L.J. 207, 214 n.26 (1987). The dogs became passive as they
learned that they were incapable of controlling the situation. Id. Even when Seligman gave
the dogs an opportunity to avoid the shocks, the dogs generally failed to avoid the shocks.
Id. Similarly, a battered woman develops learned helplessness as repeated, uncontrollable
beatings destroy the woman's ability to respond to the abuse. Id. at 214 n.27. The battered
woman comes to believe that she cannot control what happens to her. See Walker, supra note
31, at 47. As the woman's feeling of helplessness grows, she becomes passive and submissive.
Id. The concept of learned helplessness explains why the woman remains in the abusive
relationship with her spouse. Id. A battered woman faces difficulty in leaving her spouse
because of psychological, economic and social dependence, and because she may have no
where else to go. Id. at 43.
The woman's helplessness reduces the woman's problem solving ability. Id. at 48. The
woman becomes unable to see options available to her. Id. Learning that she has no control
over the violence, the woman becomes apathetic. Id. at 48-49. The woman believes that any
response she may make to the violence will be useless even when her response might have a
favorable outcome. Id. at 50. The helplessness ultimately affects the woman's emotional wellbeing, causing the woman to suffer depression and anxiety. Id.
39. See Comment, supra note 3, at 432 (discussing battered woman's learned helplessness);
supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing theory of learned helplessness).
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woman's learned helplessness forces the woman to remain in the abusive
relationship .4o
Recognizing that battered women share similar psychological character-

istics, a battered woman defendant often seeks to introduce expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome to convince the jury that the
woman's actions were reasonable under the circumstances.4 1 The battered
woman syndrome is not a defense.42 Rather, by presenting expert testimony
on the battered woman syndrome, a battered woman attempts to show that
her actions fall within the traditional doctrine of self-defense. 43 When a
court allows a battered woman defendant to present expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome, the testimony usually consists of
two components. 44 First, the expert explains the battered woman syndrome. 45
Second, the expert shows that the defendant suffered from the syndrome
and describes how the syndrome affected the defendant's behavior and
perceptions at the time of the killing. 46 By explaining that the battered
woman defendant suffered from learned helplessness, the expert testimony

concerning the battered woman syndrome explains why the defendant did
not leave her spouse. 47 The expert testimony also attempts to explain that
because of the cyclical nature of the abuse, the battered woman fears
imminent harm because the battering incident of the second stage is inevitable. 48 Additionally, the expert testimony attempts to prove that, because

40. See Note, supra note 1, at 629 (discussing battered woman's learned helplessness and
inability to leave abusive relationship); supranote 38 and accompanying text (discussing learned
helplessness affecting battered women).
41. See Comment, supra note 3, at 428 (discussing battered woman defendant's use of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome).
42. See C. EwIma, supra note 2, at 57 (discussing purpose of battered woman defendant's
use of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome).
43. See Note, supra note 1, at 626 (explaining that battered woman presents expert
testimony to convince jury that her actions were reasonable).
44. See C. EwnGo, supra note 2, at 53 (discussing content of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome).
45. Id.
46. Id. Courts that allow the use of expert testimony about the battered woman syndrome
generally admit the testimony when the defendant shows that she was a battered woman, that
the expert is qualified to testify about the syndrome, that the scientific community accepts the
syndrome as legitimate, that the subject matter is beyond the common knowledge of the jury,
and that the probative value of the testimony outweighs any prejudicial impact. See Thompson,
Defending the Battered Wife: A Challenge for Defense Attorneys, 22 TRIAL, February 1986,
at 74, 78 (discussing courts' acceptance of testimony on battered woman syndrome).
47. See C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 56 (describing battered woman defendant's use of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome to explain why defendant remained with spouse);
supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing battered woman's learned helplessness).
48. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 214 (discussing battered woman defendant's use of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome to explain why defendant feared imminent
harm); supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (describing cyclical pattern of physical and
psychological abuse occurring in relationship between battered woman and spouse). A battered
woman offers expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to reconcile the traditional
notions of self-defense and the particular facts of her case. Id. at 626. The battered woman
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of previous beatings, the woman is aware of signs of increasing violence

49
and can predict the extent of the violence in a particular battering incident.

The expert testimony explains that the woman can predict whether deadly

force is necessary to protect herself.? Essentially, the battered woman uses
the expert testimony to convince the jury that the woman acted reasonably

under the circumstances, and that her claim falls within the framework of
5

the traditional doctrine of self-defense. 1
Increasingly, courts have accepted the battered woman's claim of selfdefense, holding that testimony about the battered woman syndrome is
admissible.5 2 For example, in People v. Torres"3 the state charged the

54
defendant with the second degree murder of her common-law husband.

syndrome testimony attempts to explain that, although the killing may have occurred during
a lull in the battering, the battered woman believed that she faced inevitable harm and defended
herself at the only available opportunity. Id. By presenting the expert testimony, the battered
woman attempts to convince the jury that her belief that she faced imminent death or serious
bodily harm was reasonable. See C. EwING, supra note 2, at 53.
49. See C. EwING, supra note 2, at 53 (discussing use of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome to explain why battered woman defendant believed use of deadly force was
necessary).
50. Id.
51. See Note, supra note 1, at 621 (discussing battered woman's use of battered woman
syndrome testimony).
52. See Rodwan, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing court acceptance of battered woman
syndrome testimony); see, e.g., Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that expert testimony of battered woman syndrome is admissible for purpose of
showing reasonableness of defendant's actions where defendant pleaded self-defense); Smith
v. State, 247 Ga. 612,
-, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981) (holding that expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome is admissible because expert's conclusions about reasonableness of
defendant's actions and perceptions are conclusions that jurors could not make themselves);
State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63,
-,
716 P.2d 563, 564 (1986) (holding that trial court
improperly excluded expert testimony on battered woman syndrome because abusive relationship
is subject outside jury's understanding and is relevant to proving reasonableness of defendant's
belief that she was in imminent danger); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Ky.
1987) (upholding trial court's limitations on expert testimony concerning battered woman
syndrome); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, -,
478 A.2d 364, 368 (1984) (holding that expert
testimony about battered woman syndrome is admissible and relevant to honesty and reasonableness of defendant's fear of imminent danger); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, -,
488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that expert testimony concerning battered
woman syndrome is admissible as relevant to defendant's self-defense claim); State v. Gallegos,
104 N.M. 247,
-,
719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that trial court
improperly excluded term "battered woman syndrome" from testimony of expert on psychological effects of abusive relationship); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398,
-, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122
(1986) (holding that trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome because testimony is critical to defendant's self-defense claim); State v. Allery, 101
Wash. 2d 591,
-,
682 P.2d 312, 313 (1984) (holding that testimony on battered woman
syndrome is admissible to prove that defendant feared imminent danger).
53. 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
54. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129,
-, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985). The defendant, Lydia Torres shot and killed her common-law husband, Ruperto Rosado,
as he sat in a chair in the living room of the couple's apartment. Id. The defendant testified
that on the night of the killing, Rosado had flown into a rage and accused the defendant of
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The defendant claimed that she killed her husband in self-defense and
offered expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to support her
claim. 5 In considering the issue of whether to admit the expert testimony,
the New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term stated that the standard for

evaluating the defendant's conduct was whether the defendant's subjective
belief of the imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable.5 6 The
Torres court held that the expert testimony was relevant to the jury's

determination of reasonableness because the testimony had a substantial
bearing on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing. 7 The
court further held that the expert testimony was admissible because the

testimony's subject matter was outside the common knowledge
of the jury
5s
and had gained acceptance in the scientific community.
Some commentators argue that the battered woman syndrome is legally

and empirically flawed, and that courts, therefore, should not allow testimony concerning the syndrome. 9 One commentator asserts that research
concerning the battered woman syndrome contains methodological, theoretical, and interpretative flaws.6 The commentator argues that the research

having sexual relations with Rosado's son. Id. at -, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 360. When the
defendant denied the allegation, Rosado began beating the defendant. Id. at -, 488 N.Y.S.2d
at 360-61. Placing a pistol against the defendant's mouth, Rosado asserted that "this is going
to be your [the defendant's] last night." Id. at -,
488 N.Y.S.2d at 361. Rosado then
placed the gun on a table and walked into the living room, where he continued to threaten
the defendant. Id. The defendant picked up the gun, went into the living room, and shot
Rosado three times while he sat in a chair. Id. The defendant testified that she was convinced
that the severity of the violence was greater than previous incidents of abuse and that the
defendant would kill her. Id.
55. Id. at

-,

488 N.Y.S.2d at 359.

56. Id. at
, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 360. In determining whether the defendant's subjective
belief of the necessity of deadly self-defensive force was reasonable, the Supreme Court of
New York stated in People v. Torres that evidence of prior violence and abuse was admissible
and relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of harm at the time of the killing.
Id. Therefore, the court admitted expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Id. at
,

488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.

57. Id. at 636. The Torres court found that expert testimony concerning the battered
woman syndrome was central to the defendant's justification defense. Id. The expert's testimony
would explain that the defendant had learned to distinguish between varying degrees of
violence. Id. The court found that the testimony would explain to the jury that, at the time
of the killing, the defendant believed Rosado's violence had become life threatening. Id. The
court found also that the testimony would explain to the jury why the defendant remained
with Rosado and would dispel the jury's notion that the abuse must not have been extreme
because the defendant did not leave. Id.
58. Id. at

-,

488 N.Y.S.2d at 362-63.

59. See Note, supra note 1, at 631-44 (criticizing battered woman syndrome).
60. Id. One commentator asserts that the research design of the battered woman syndrome's cycle theory contains five major flaws that affect the validity of the theory. Id. at
637. First, in interviewing the battered women in the most prominent study regarding battered
women, researchers asked leading questions that may have influenced the women's responses.
Id. Second, the researcher supports her finding of the stages of "tension building" and "loving
contrition" not from the women's responses directly but from the interviewers interpretation
of the responses. Id. at 637. The commentator asserts that often the researcher's expectancies
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has not shown sufficiently that the repeated abuse causes a single distinctive
behavior pattern. 61 Furthermore, commentators claim that testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome often does not support the woman's
claim of self-defense. 62

Because of the battered woman syndrome's flaws, expert testimony
about the battered woman syndrome frequently fails to help establish a

battered woman's claim of self-defense. 63 Some courts simply have held that
testimony concerning the syndrome is inadmissible.Y For example, in State

v. Necaise&5 the state indicted the defendant for manslaughter in the shooting

bias the researchers evaluation of the women's responses. Id. at 638. Third, the researcher
failed to place the three phases of the syndrome within any time frame. Id. at 638. The timing
of the phases has legal importance in self-defense cases because a tension building stage
occurring only a few minutes prior to a battering incident would not cause a woman to suffer
from constant fear. Id. Fourth, the researcher failed to support her contention that the cycle
of violence leads battered women to feel constant fear. Id. For example, only half of the
women in the study unequivocally stated that they had ever believed their husbands would kill
them. Id. at 639. The commentator therefore concludes that many battered women experience
less than a constant state of fear of death or serious bodily injury. Id. Fifth, the research
does not support the researcher's finding that an abusive relationship conforms to a distinctive
behavioral cycle. Id. The commentator asserts that the researcher supplied data of the various
stages separately, thus failing to show exactly how many of the women in the study actually
experienced all three phases of the cycle. Id.
61. Id. at 644.
62. See C. EwiNo, supra note 2, at 52 (discussing battered woman syndrome testimony's
failure to support self-defense claim); Note, supra note 1, at 640 (discussing inapplicability of
battered woman syndrome testimony to claim of self-defense). One commentator asserts that
battered woman syndrome testimony does not adequately provide the jury with an understanding of the danger the woman felt at the time she killed her spouse. See Note, supra note 1,
at 640. For example, the commentator argues that the battered woman syndrome theory
provides no insight into whether the defendant used a reasonable amount of force to prevent
the perceived harm. Id. In addition, the commentator argues that the battered woman syndrome
does not sufficiently address the problem of establishing imminence, but attempts instead to
stretch the imminence requirement to include fear of future harm. Id. at 631. Another
commentator argues that the expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome provides no
support for the battered woman's assertion that she acted reasonably under the circumstances.
See C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 55. The commentator further argues that by asserting that the
woman was helpless, an expert's testimony may contradict the woman's claim of self-defense.
Id. at 56. The commentator claims that the jury may question why the woman took action if
supposedly she was passive and helpless. Id. Finally, the commentator argues that instead of
convincing the jury that the defendant acted reasonably, expert testimony simply explains why
the defendant acted unreasonably. Id. at 59.
63. See Comment, supra note 3, at 428 (discussing battered woman's failure to prove
self-defense despite testimony on battered woman syndrome).
64. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663, 677-78 (La. 1982) (holding that expert
testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome is inadmissible because expert testimony
can apply only to claim of mental disease or defect); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,
, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981) (holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
is inadmissible because testimony is irrelevant to self-defense claim, is within ken of jury, is
not accepted by scientific community, and is overly prejudicial); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d
1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) (excluding battered woman syndrome testimony under requirements
for admissibility of expert testimony).
65. 466 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
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death of her husband.6 Shortly after the defendant's husband allegedly beat

the defendant, the defendant shot her husband in the back and in the back

of his head as he lay in bed. 67 Despite the defendant's plea of self-defense,
the trial court convicted the defendant of manslaughter. 68 The defendant
appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome.6 9 The defendant argued that the
testimony was necessary to show the defendant's state of mind at the time

perception of
of the killing and to convince the jury that the defendant's
70
the danger that her husband posed was reasonable.

The Court of Appeals of Louisiana held that absent a plea of "not
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity," testimony attempting to prove

that the defendant suffered from battered woman syndrome was inadmissible. 7' The Necaise court explained that admitting the testimony would
condone improperly the concept of partial responsibility, allowing proof of
mental incapacity short of insanity to show the defendant's lack of specific
intent. 72 The court further held that the evidence that the defendant shot
her husband in the back and the back of the head while he was in bed was
sufficient to show that the defendant did not act in self-defense. 7 The court
stated that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's finding that the
defendant's fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury was unreasonable. 74
The court's opinion in State v. Necaise illustrates some of the obstacles
a battered woman defendant must overcome to succeed on a claim of self

66. State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 662 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
67. Id. at 663.
68. Id. at 622. At trial the defendant in State v. Necaise claimed that during the evening
on which she killed her husband, her husband had slapped her, kicked her, and verbally
abused her. Id. The defendant further testified that her husband had forced her at knifepoint
to engage in sexual relations and had held the knife to her throat, threatening to kill her. Id.
at 663. The defendant testified that she believed her husband would kill her and, that,
therefore, she got out of bed and pulled a gun from under the mattress. Id. The defendant
claimed that upon hearing her husband begin to get out of the bed, she turned and saw him
raise his clenched fist. Id. At this point, she shot her husband. Id. The defendant's husband
died from three bullet wounds to the left back and two bullet wounds to the back left side
of his head. Id. at 662. The defendant admitted shooting her husband, but asserted that her
action was justified because she acted in self-defense. Id. at 663. Nevertheless, the jury found
the defendant guilty of manslaughter and sentenced her to 12 years of hard labor. Id. at 662.
69. Id. at 663.
70. Id. at 664.
71. Id. at 665.
72. Id.
73. Id. At trial in State v. Necaise, the state showed that the defendant had no bruises
or other indication of violence to support her claim that her husband had beaten her on the
night of the killing. Id. at 669. Additionally, the police found the victim lying in bed,
apparently asleep when the defendant fired the shots. Id. Finally, the state showed that the
knife with which the defendant claimed the victim had threatened her contained no fingerprints
and was found covered with a handkerchief underneath the victim's armpit. Id.
74. Id. at 670.
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defense. 75 The Necaise court appeared hesitant to find that expert testimony

concerning the battered woman syndrome was relevant to the defendant's
self-defense claim. 76 In addition, the court indicated that the expert testi-

mony, even if admitted, would fail to establish a reasonable
fear of imminent
77
harm justifying the defendant's use of deadly force.

In addition to courts that have excluded expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome, some courts have upheld convictions of battered women
defendants after having allowed the testimony. 78 For example, in State v.
Nunn79 the defendant appealed from a jury finding that the defendant was
guilty of second-degree murder in the stabbing death of her live-in boyfriend. 0 Before the killing the defendant's boyfriend had been throwing
objects at the defendant during a heated argument." The boyfriend had

retreated to another room, and the defendant followed him a few minutes
later and stabbed him. 2 The trial court sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for up to fifty years. 83 The Iowa Court of Appeals held that the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that there was a coolingoff period prior to the stabbing and that the defendant therefore had acted

with malice aforethought.

4

At trial, the defendant presented expert testi-

mony about the battered woman syndrome to explain why the defendant

believed deadly force was necessary to avert imminent death or serious
bodily harm. 85 The Nunn court held that the jury was not obliged to accept
as conclusive the expert testimony. 6 Furthermore, the court held that even
if the jury had accepted the expert testimony, the other evidence presented
could support a jury finding that the defendant's fear of danger was
unreasonable.8 7 The court explained that the fact that the argument ended

a few minutes before the killing and that the victim was unarmed at the

75. See id. at 665 (excluding testimony on battered woman syndrome presented to support
claim of self-defense).
76. See id. (stating that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible
only in support of insanity claim).

77. See id. at 670 (stating that evidence was sufficient to support jury finding that
battered woman defendant acted unreasonably).
78. See State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (upholding conviction
of battered woman defendant despite presentation of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 (N.D. 1983) (admitting expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome but holding that court need not include specific instruction on
syndrome).
79. 356 N.W. 2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
80. State v. Nunn, 356 N.W. 2d 601, 603 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
81. Id. at 604.
82. Id. The trial court record in State v. Nunn revealed that the defendant stabbed her
boyfriend during a lull in a heated argument during which both the defendant and the
boyfriend had brandished knives. Id. at 603-04.
83. Id. at 603.
84. Id. at 604.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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time of the killing supported the jury finding that the defendant's actions
and perceptions were unreasonable.88 Generally, testimony on the battered
woman syndrome fails to support a defendant's claim of self-defense because
the testimony does not convince juries that the defendant's actions were
reasonable. s 9
C.

THEoRY Op "PsYcHoLoGICAL

SELF-DEFENSE"

Attempting to provide a solution to the problems facing battered women
defendants, clinical psychologist, attorney, and professor Charles Ewing has
proposed a theory of "psychological self-defense" to justify battered women's actionsP ° The theory of psychological self-defense justifies the use of
deadly force to avert extremely serious psychological injury caused by
repeated physical and emotional abuse. 9' Ewing argues that the claim of a
battered woman who kills in self-defense often does not fit within the
narrow limits of the traditional self-defense doctrine9 Even when a court
admits testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome, Ewing argues
that the testimony often does not support a battered woman's self-defense
claim. 93 Ewing asserts that women who face repeated physical abuse should
be justified in using deadly force even during non-violent periods to repel
94
extremely serious psychological injury caused by the abuse.
In proposing the theory of psychological self-defense, Ewing argues that
courts should expand the interpretation of "self" under self-defense law to
include both emotional and physical well-being. 95 Ewing attempts to eliminate the problems that the imminence and reasonable force requirements of
the traditional self-defense doctrine pose for a battered woman who claims
self-defense.96 Ewing seeks to show that a battered woman constantly fears
destruction of her emotional stability, thus satisfying the imminence require-

88. Id.
89. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 214 (discussing why battered woman syndrome

testimony often fails to support claim of self-defense). One commentator argues that expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome might actually undermine a battered woman's
defense. See C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 56. The commentator argues that emphasizing the
woman's learned helplessness is inconsistent with the woman's taking control of the situation
by killing her spouse. Id.
90. See C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 6, 78 (presenting theory of psychological self-defense).
91. Id. (defining psychological self-defense). Ewing defines extremely serious psychological injury as "gross and enduring impairment of one's psychological functioning which

significantly limits the meaning and value of one's physical existence." Id. at 79.
92. See id. at 46-50 (discussing traditional doctrine of self-defense).
93. See id. at 51-60 (discussing use of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
and self-defense). Ewing argues that battered woman syndrome testimony is incapable of
explaining the reasonableness of the woman's homicidal act. Id.
94. Id. at 62.
95. Id.
96. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 217 (discussing Ewing's theory of psychological selfdefense).
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ment. 97 Ewing asserts that at some point in a relationship between a battered

woman and her spouse, the battered woman suddenly perceives the continuing abuse as a basic threat, not only to her physical safety, but also to
her psychological health. 98 At this point, the woman begins to experience a

constant fear of harm that affects all aspects of her life. 9 The woman

perceives that her spouse poses an imminent threat of danger and believes
that she must take action to stop the abuse.100 Ewing rejects the traditional

self-defense doctrine's reasonable force requirement, which permits the
battered woman to use deadly force only if the woman reasonably believes
her spouse poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury.' 0' Ewing's

proposal would justify the use of deadly force if the woman reasonably
believed that the force was necessary to prevent extremely serious psychological injury. 0 2

According to Ewing, a jury must answer two questions in resolving a
claim of psychological self-defense: whether the defendant honestly believed

that the victim was threatening the defendant with extremely serious psychological injury, and whether the defendant's belief was reasonable under
the circumstances.10 3 Ewing contends that the abusive relationship has both
°4
severe physical and psychological consequences for the battered woman.'
According to Ewing some psychological consequences of the abuse may be
as significant as death. 10 5 Ewing contends therefore that many battered

women who kill their spouses, including women who kill during a lull in
the violence, do so in self-defense, although not necessarily in the traditional

97. See C. EWING, supra note 2, at 62 (discussing theory of psychological self-defense
and imminence requirement of traditional doctrine of self-defense).
98. Id. at 65.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 218 (discussing Ewing's repudiation of reasonable
force requirement in traditional self-defense doctrine).
102. See C. EWING, supra note 2, at 79. In developing his doctrine of psychological selfdefense, Ewing relies on principles from the fields of self-psychology, psychopathology,
victimology, and the psychology of terrorism. Id. at 63-75. Ewing emphasizes the discipline
of self-psychology to support his proposition that battered women fear the destruction of their
psychological well-being. Id. at 66. Ewing asserts that the abuse battered women suffer causes
the women to lose self-esteem and to view their lives as meaningless. Id. Ewing claims that
battered women live their lives "without feeling alive." Id.
Relying on the disciplines of victimology and the psychology of terrorism, Ewing compares
battered women with victims of crime and victims of terrorism. Id. at 70-73. Ewing contends
that, as victims of violent crime, battered women suffer from fear, depression, anxiety, and
hopelessness as do other victims of violent crime. Id. at 72. Ewing also contends that spousal
abuse is a form of terrorism. Id. at 73. Finally, Ewing relies on the discipline of psychopathology
to support his claim that repeated beatings cause battered women to become depressed, and,
at times, suicidal. Id. at 69.
103. Id. at 92.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 62. Ewing argues that the psychological effects of the abuse often are more
significant than the physical injuries because the psychological effects may prevent the woman
from leaving her spouse or seeking help. Id.
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legal sense of the term. 106 Ewing asserts that the battered women constantly
fear destruction of their psychological well-being. °7 Accordingly, Ewing
argues that the battered women kill to defend against the loss of their
psychological stability.108
Ewing contends that the theory of psychological self-defense is consistent
with and a necessary extension of the traditional doctrine of self-defense.' 9
Ewing recognizes that the doctrine of psychological self-defense justifies the
taking of human life to preserve a battered woman's mental stability as
well as her life. 10 Ewing contends that current law already allows the taking
of human life in other non-life threatening situations."' Ewing states that
current self-defense law does not always require a reasonable fear of
imminent death or serious bodily injury to justify a killing." 2 In support
of this argument, Ewing discusses several criminal law doctrines that justify
the use of deadly force when clearly only psychological interests are at
stake." 3 Ewing asserts that the doctrines of retreat, defense of habitation,
and the use of deadly force to avert rape or kidnapping indicate that the
law may protect purely psychological interests."14 According to Ewing, the
fact that many jurisdictions do not require a person to retreat from an
attack places a higher value on the psychological interest of avoiding
5
humiliation and the appearance of cowardice than on the aggressor's life."
Ewing further argues that the doctrine which allows a person to use deadly
force to prevent unlawful entry into the person's home is concerned with
protecting the person's psychological interest of feeling secure in his home."16
Finally, Ewing claims that the doctrines allowing a person to use deadly
force to prevent a rape or kidnapping also places greater weight on preserving psychological interests of bodily integrity and autonomy than on
preserving the aggressor's life." 7 Accordingly, Ewing argues that the protection of a battered woman's psychological well-being should outweigh the
spouse's interest in remaining alive."'
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Ewing argues that battered women defendants kill to defend against the destruction
of important psychological attributes. Id. According to Ewing, a person's psychological
functions, processes, and experiences give meaning and value to life. Id. Ewing contends that
constant abuse causes extremely serious psychological injury resulting in what amounts to
"psychological death." Id. at 79; see also supra note 91 (defining extremely serious psychological injury).
109. C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 78.
110. Id. at 80.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 81. Ewing notes that although a strong interest against the taking of another
person's life exists, a policy against requiring a person to act in a cowardly manner also exists.
Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 82.
118. Id. at 80.
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CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE

Ewing proposes the theory of psychological self-defense to provide
battered woman defendants with an alternative to traditional self-defense." 9
State v. Necaise and State v. Nunn illustrate some of the obstacles that a
battered woman defendant must overcome to succeed on a claim of selfdefense. 20 In Necaise the court held that testimony concerning the battered
woman syndrome is inadmissible because the testimony improperly would
condone the concept of partial responsibility.' 2 ' The court explained that
the expert testimony would attempt to prove that the defendant suffered
from a mental defect short of insanity, which the state has rejected as
evidence of lack of intent. 22 For the same reasons, the Necaise court likely
would be unwilling to admit expert testimony in support of a claim of
psychological self-defense. 23 The Necaise court rationale would defeat a
battered woman defendant's claim in a case in which the defendant would
need to present expert testimony to explain why the defendant believed that
24
her spouse was destroying the defendant psychologically.
Ewing asserts that under the doctrine of traditional self-defense and the
theory of psychological self-defense, the jury must assess the defendant's
alleged fear by considering the circumstances surrounding the killing.In5 The
mental state required in a claim of psychological self-defense, reasonable
fear of extremely serious psychological injury, is different from the traditional self-defense doctrine's requirement of reasonable fear of imminent
death or serious bodily injury. 26 However, Ewing explains that the process
of determining the reasonableness of the fear is the same under both
doctrines. 27 Under either doctrine, the jury would assess whether, under
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have perceived the situation
as did the defendant.' 2 Thus, under the court's analysis in State v. Nunn,
119. Id. at 6.
120. See supra notes 65-88 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Necaise and State
v. Nunn).
121. State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1985). In Necaise the court held
that testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome is inadmissible unless the defendant
pleads "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity." Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 665 (discussing inadmissibility of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome).
124. See C. EwrNc, supra note 2, at 94 (discussing battered woman defendant's use of
testimony on battered woman syndrome to support claim of psychological self-defense). Ewing
states that expert testimony would be relevant in assessing claims of psychological self-defense.
Id. The defendant would use the testimony to show that she shared psychological characteristics
with other battered women. Id.
125. Id. at 93.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id. Ewing contends that the jury must use common-sense and everyday experience
in considering a claim of psychological self-defense just as they would in considering claims
of traditional self-defense. Id. at 94. Ewing argues that most people would understand what
fear of extremely serious psychological injury would be like. Id.
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the defendant would have had little chance of success, even if the doctrine
of psychological self-defense had been available. 29 According to the Nunn
court, the jury is free to decide which evidence to accept and which evidence
to reject.1 30 Under Nunn, therefore, the jury still could reject evidence
supporting the defendant's claim of psychological self-defense and find that
the defendant's fear was unreasonable.'
Although Ewing proposes the theory of psychological self-defense to
justify the actions of battered women defendants, the theory fails to prove
adequately that the defendant's actions were reasonable.132 Ewing recognizes
that expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome might elicit
an unfavorable response from a jury because the jury might believe that
the testimony attempted to establish a separate "battered woman defense."' 33
Ewing argues that a jury might misunderstand the expert testimony, believing
that the testimony attempts to show that battered women have a license to
kill. 3 4 Ewing does not acknowledge, however, that pleading psychological
self-defense might create a similar reaction in a jury. 35 Additionally, because
the theory of psychological self-defense is such a radical extension of the
current doctrine of self-defense, courts likely will be unwilling to accept the
theory as a legitimate justification of a battered woman's actions. 3 6 For
example, Ewing advocates a broader interpretation of the imminence requirement that courts already have appeared reluctant to accept in battered
women cases. 3 7 Also Ewing's proposal allowing the use of deadly force to
prevent extremely serious psychological injury is a drastic change from
current self-defense law. 3 8 As a result, establishing the doctrine of psychological self-defense as a legitimate defense under the law likely will require
39
legislative action.

129. See State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting battered
woman defendant's self-defense claim).
130. See id. (discussing jury consideration of evidence).
131. See id. (holding that evidence was sufficient to support jury conclusion that defendant's fear of danger was unreasonable); see also supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing evidence and testimony in State v. Nunn).
132. See infra notes 133-145 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in psychological
self-defense doctrine).
133. See C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 57 (discussing problems created by use of expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome).
134. Id.
135. See id. (failing to discuss whether jury might view claim of psychological self-defense
as attempt to establish "battered woman defense").
136. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 212 (stating that courts are more willing to accept
exemptions from traditional self-defense doctrine than direct attacks on doctrine).
137. See C. EwiNG, supra note 2, at 62 (discussing theory of psychological self-defense
and imminence requirement of traditional self-defense).
138. See supranotes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable force requirement
of traditional self-defense).
139. Compare supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing elements of claim of
traditional self-defense) with supra notes 90-108 (discussing requirements of claim of psychological self-defense). A legislative codification of the doctrine of psychological self-defense
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Furthermore, one commentator argues that Ewing's theory of psycho-

logical self-defense contains several flaws."40 First, the commentator asserts
that instead of arguing that the battered woman's actions were reasonable

based on notions of justice, Ewing creates an abstraction in which the
woman kills to prevent her spouse from destroying her psychological well-

being.' 4' According to the commentator, Ewing argues that the traditional
doctrine of self-defense is inadequate because it does not fit within the
common sense notion that a woman who has faced repeated abuse may be
justified in resorting to deadly force.142 The commentator claims that instead

of providing a solution that would recognize the common sense notion that
the use of deadly force was reasonable, Ewing replaces the technical and

ritualistic doctrine of traditional self-defense with yet another formalistic
and complicated doctrine. 4 3 The commentator further argues that Ewing

fails to provide any guidelines for determining whether the battered woman
killed her spouse justly or unjustly.'" Finally, the commentator asserts that

Ewing provides no insight into how the doctrine of psychological selfdefense might apply in some cases and not in others. 45
E.

SUGGESTIONS FOR DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN WHO KLL

Ewing fails to provide a workable solution to the problems of defending

battered women who kill their spouses.

46

Ewing's theory, however, does

illustrate that battered woman defendants need solutions to allow them to

might look like the following:
"The use of deadly force toward another person is justified if the actor reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to prevent extremely serious psychological injury.
(1) Extremely serious psychological injury is gross and enduring impairment of the actor's
psychological functioning that significantly limits the meaning and value of the actor's
physical existence.
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable unless
(a) the actor reasonably believed that the victim was threatening the defendant with
extremely serious psychological injury, and
(b)the actor's belief was reasonable under the circumstances."
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (codifying traditional
doctrine of self-defense).
140. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 221-26 (discussing flaws in Ewing's doctrine of
psychological self-defense).
141. Id. at 224.
142. Id. at 220.
143. Id. at 220-21. Faigman notes that Ewing conducted no research to support his
contention that battered women defendants actually feared psychological injury when they
killed their spouses. Id. at 224.
144. Id.
145. Id. Faigman argues that the psychological principles that Ewing uses to support his
doctrine are not readily accepted in the mainstream of either clinical or research circles of
psychology. Id. at 221. Furthermore, Faigman contends that Ewing provides no suggestions
for what form expert testimony should take, nor does Ewing provide any basis for his assertion
that physical abuse causes severe psychological disabilities. Id. at 222-23.
146. See supra notes 119-45 (discussing flaws of theory of psychological self-defense).
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show that their actions were reasonable and that the killings were justifiable
under the circumstances. 47 The formalistic and narrow interpretation of
self-defense does not address fairly or adequately the circumstances surrounding battered women's actions.' 4 A partial solution to the problem of
defending battered women who kill would be for courts to interpret more
broadly the imminence requirement of the traditional doctrine of selfdefense. 49 Under a broader interpretation of imminence, a battered woman
defendant could show that although her spouse may not have posed an
immediate threat, she reasonably feared that death or serious bodily injury
was inevitable. 50 Not only would a broader interpretation of the imminence
requirement assist a battered woman defendant, the broader requirement
might apply in other criminal law situations. 5 For example, the broader
interpretation would allow an abused child defendant to assert that inevitable
injury justified the use of deadly force against his parent. 5 2 Courts also
could allow a battered woman to show the cumulative effect of the abuse
upon the woman. 53 The cumulative effect theory would show that because
of the repeated abuse, the battered woman honestly and reasonably perceived
54
constant danger.'
To further assist battered women defendants, courts should apply a
subjective test of reasonableness in assessing the defendant's actions. 5 The
court should allow the jury to consider all the relevant circumstances leading
to the killing to determine whether the defendant honestly believed that
deadly force was necessary to avert death or serious bodily injury. 56
Evidence of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's action would
explain the reasonableness of the defendant's perceptions and actions. 57
The evidence should include testimony concerning the defendant's inability
to leave her spouse and the defendant's belief that alternatives to the use

147. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 227 (discussing need for solution to problems facing
battered women defendants).
148. See Note, supra note 1, at 643 (discussing unfairness of traditional doctrine of selfdefense in battered woman context).
149. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of courts applying
broader interpretation of imminence to self-defense claims).
150. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing imminence requirement of
traditional doctrine of self-defense); supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing battered
woman's fear of inevitable harm).
151. See C. EyNG, supra note 2, at 80 (discussing applicability of modified doctrine of
self-defense to various criminal law situations).
152. See id. (discussing similarity between battered women defendants and abused children
defendants).
153. See Rodwan, supra note 1, at 65 (discussing cumulative effect of repeated abuse).
154. Id. One commentator argues that courts should allow the defendant to introduce
evidence of the spouse's prior violent behavior. Id. The commentator states that evidence of
abuse during prior moments, days, or weeks would be relevant to the defendant's argument
that her spouse provoked the killing. Id.
155. See Note, supra note 1, at 643.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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of deadly force did not exist. 5 s Additionally, courts should allow evidence
of subtle threats and actions by the defendant's spouse that might cause
the battered woman honestly to believe that the spouse posed an imminent
threat of serious harm."59 Courts also should admit evidence of violence
occurring days or weeks prior to the killing to show that the spouse provoked
the defendant's actions. 60 Courts also could consider previous patterns of
the spouse's violent behavior.' 61 Studies indicate that a battered woman is
aware of signals of increasing violence and may change her behavior in
attempts to placate her spouse. 62 Testimony about past patterns of violence
might explain the woman's fear of danger, her choice to remain with her
spouse, the lack of apparent alternatives, and the reasonableness of her use
of deadly force. 163 Furthermore, courts should allow evidence of the spouse's
reputation for violence to support the defendant's subjective belief that she
was in imminent danger. 64
To further explain the woman's actions, courts should allow evidence
that would allow the jury to understand why the perception of imminent
harm and allowable degree of force might be different for women than for
men. 65 For example, courts should permit the jury to consider the relative
size and strength of the defendant and her spouse in determining whether

the defendant used a reasonable amount of force.

66

In addition, courts

should instruct the jury that although use of a weapon may be unreasonable

in a fist fight between two men, use of a weapon may be necessary for a
woman to protect herself from her unarmed spouse. 1 67 By admitting evidence

concerning the unique characteristics of an abusive relationship, courts
158. Id. at 646. In addition to the theory of learned helplessness, researchers have suggested
that other factors may prevent a battered woman from leaving her spouse. Id. at 645. The
factors include lack of economic resources and friends and family to provide economic and
emotional support. Id. One commentator argues that it might be sufficient simply to inform
the jury that the woman honestly believed that she had no other choice but to remain with
her spouse. Id.
159. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 634 (stating that battered women are attentive to
signs of escalating violence provided by abusive spouse).
160. See Rodwan, supra note 1, at 65 (stating that prior acts of violence are relevant to
establishing battered woman defendant's state of mind). Courts should allow juries to consider
all the facts known to the defendant, including those occurring long before the killing. See
Note, supra note 1, at 644 (stating that jury should consider all relevant circumstances occurring
prior to killing).
161. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 634 (discussing patterns of violence in abusive
relationship).
162. Id.
163. See Note, supra note I, at 644 (discussing battered woman defendant's use of
testimony about past incidents of violence).
164. Id.
165. See Faigman, supra note 38, at 226 (proposing flexible application of traditional
doctrine of self-defense).
166. See Rodwan, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that defendant may use amount of force
that appears necessary to prevent imminent injury).
167. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 633 (noting that ordinary injury man inflicts on
another man is different than injury spouse inflicts on battered woman).
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would allow a battered woman an opportunity to convince the jury that
her actions were reasonable and justified.' 6 Finally, when instructing the
jury, courts should emphasize the relevance of the unique situation and
perspectives of the battered woman defendant.' 69
F.

CONCLUSION

Many battered women facing homicide charges after killing their abusive
spouses plead self-defense. 70 Although years of physical and psychological
abuse would appear to justify the women's use of deadly force, the women
7
often fail to satisfy the strict requirements of traditional self-defense.' '
Many battered women defendants present expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome in support of their claims of self-defense. 72 Often, however, the expert testimony fails to assist in establishing the battered women's
claims.'7 Psychologist and attorney Charles Ewing has attempted to address
the problem of defending battered women who kill their spouses by proposing his theory of psychological self-defense. 74 Although Ewing's theory
points out the great need for solutions to the dilemma faced by battered
women defendants, it fails to provide a viable solution. 175 In proposing his
theory, however, Ewing emphasizes the plight of battered women and
highlights the need for courts to recognize that, in many instances, the
battered women's actions are reasonable and justifiable.
JILL SUzANNE TALBOT

168. Id.
169. See id. (discussing importance of proper jury instructions in battered woman context).
170. See C. Ewumo, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing defense of battered women who kill
their spouses).
171. See supra notes 9-29 and accompanying text (discussing battered women defendants'
inability to satisfy elements of traditional self-defense).
172. See Note, supra note 1, at 619 (discussing use of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome to support claim of self-defense); supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text (discussing
battered woman syndrome).
173. See supra notes 63-88 (discussing battered women's failure to prove self-defense
despite testimony on battered woman syndrome).
174. See supra notes 90-118 (discussing theory of psychological self-defense).
175. See supra notes 119-45 (criticizing theory of psychological self-defense).

